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Two Concepts of Community
Erica L. Neely
Abstract: Communities play an important role in many areas of philosophy, ranging from epistemology
through social and political philosophy. However, two notions of community are often conflated. The
descriptive concept of community takes a community to be a collection of individuals satisfying a particular
description. The relational concept of community takes a community to consist of more than a set of members
satisfying a particular trait; there must also be a relation of recognition among the members or between the
members and the community as a whole. The descriptive concept is simpler, however, it does not provide a
sufficiently robust concept of community. I argue instead that the relational notion is philosophically richer
and more accurately captures the true nature of a community.

I.

Introduction

Communities play an important role in much philosophical thinking. Philosophers of language use
the notion of linguistic communities in reference-fixing. 1 Epistemologists track the transmission of
knowledge within communities by considering chains of testimony. 2 Social and political
philosophers discuss communitarianism and problems that arise when an individual clashes with
their community. 3 All of these people discuss communities, yet it is not entirely clear what they
mean by “a community.”
A principal reason that it is difficult to determine the nature of communities is because there are two
notions of community that are often conflated. The first of these, which I will call the descriptive
concept, takes a community to be a collection of individuals satisfying a particular description; we
can define a community of all people living in a particular country, for instance. The second notion,
which I will call the relational concept, takes a community to consist of more than a set of members
satisfying a particular trait; there must also be a relation of recognition among the members or
between the members and the community as a whole. By developing these two notions, I will show
that the descriptive concept of community is not generally robust enough to capture our
understanding of community; we need the richness of the relational concept to do it justice. I will
thus expand upon the nature of the relevant relation, as well as raise some issues for future
exploration.
II.

The Descriptive Concept of Community

The descriptive concept of community is the simpler of the two notions. Using this definition, a
community is simply any set of individuals who share a common trait. For instance, we can define
1

The classical starting point for this is, of course, Hilary Putnam’s discussion of the division of linguistic labor in “The
Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” although it has spawned a multitude of articles on the topic.
2
C.A.J. Coady wrote one of the first comprehensive discussions of testimony in Testimony: A Philosophical Study.
Recently there has been a great deal of interest in testimony from many different perspectives; see for instance The
Epistemology of Testimony, ed. Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa.
3
There are far too many readings on this topic to list, ranging from classical discussions by Karl Marx or John Stuart
Mill, through contemporary debates over drug use or physician-assisted suicide. The conflict between the individual
and his or her community has been a perpetual topic for philosophers.
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the community of American citizens simply as all those people who satisfy the condition of being
an American citizen. Any logical combination of properties will serve to define a community; it is
not necessary to use only a single one. If we wish to consider the community of philosophy
graduate students, for instance, we can define the community as those people who are both graduate
students and people enrolled at a university to study philosophy. Similarly, it could be useful to
consider the students of a particular college or department within a university. Suppose that
Nowhere University offers four modern language majors: French, German, Spanish, and Italian.
We can thus define the community of modern language majors, CL, as consisting of those people
who are a) enrolled at Nowhere University and b) majoring in French or German or Spanish or
Italian.
These examples are all fairly straightforward. There are ways of clearly determining whether
someone is an American citizen or a graduate student, as those properties are strictly defined by
rules. However, the majority of communities defined this way are likely to be less clear-cut. For
instance, consider the community of African-Americans, defined simply as consisting of all people
who are African-American. Although this sounds straightforward at first glance, it will be much
more difficult to determine the membership of this community because the property in question is
fuzzy. Many factors have been used to classify people into races, including ancestry, appearance,
and culture. 4 If we take being African-American to be determined by ancestry, it leaves open the
question of how many ancestors with the trait must a person possess. Presumably a single nonAfrican-American ancestor will not serve to exclude a person from this community. But it is not
clear that a single African-American ancestor would serve to include a person in the community
either; the boundaries likely lie somewhere in between, although it is not clear where. 5
Furthermore, we often use other criteria in our judgments about race, such as bodily appearance;
while the set of people with a particular appearance may overlap with the set of people having a
particular ancestry, the sets are unlikely to be identical. Hence, even though the descriptive concept
of community is relatively straightforward to understand, there will be complications to determining
community membership.
One oddity of membership worth mentioning is that, using this definition of community, it is
possible to be a member of a community without anyone knowing it – including yourself. This
notion of community membership is based on truth conditions: if you satisfy the description, you
are a member of the community. It does not include any recognition conditions; hence, you do not
have to be recognized as a member of that community, either by yourself or by others. Moreover,
you are a member of the community even if others erroneously identify you as a non-member. If
you are a French major at Nowhere University, you are a member of CL, even if the majority of
people think you are in Engineering. 6 Historically, descriptive concepts of race were used to try to
4

See Charles Mills, “ ‘But What Are You Really?’ The Metaphysics of Race,” for a discussion of the multiplicity of
concepts used to defined race.
5
Two notes: first, the proximity of the relative will probably matter; both parents being of African-American descent is
more likely to make a child a member of the community than two great-great-grandparents of such ethnicity. Second,
the criteria for membership of this community will vary over time, since there have been eras in which a single AfricanAmerican ancestor would, indeed, serve to include the person in the community.
6
Obviously at least one person will have to believe that you are a French major, namely whoever is handling the
administration of enrolling majors. That, however, is simply in the nature of being a French major; it requires the
consent of others to obtain. The fact remains that none of your peers need to think that you are a French major for you
to be one.
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prevent people from passing – the idea was that even if you appeared to be white, you still “really”
were black because you satisfied some criterion of ancestry. 7 However, the descriptive conception
of community actually is stronger than that because it claims that you could be wrong about your
own community membership as well. 8 This might seem somewhat bizarre; after all, often
communities are lauded because of the bonds between members or the communication that goes on
within them. 9 This interaction clearly cannot take place if people are unknowingly members of a
community, which raises the question of whether such a collection of people truly should count as a
community.
There are two other serious problems for the descriptive concept of community. First, it is not clear
that this concept is sufficient to define many of the communities mentioned in the opening
paragraph. For instance, trying to devise a description that would generate the right set of
individuals for a linguistic community is difficult. We cannot simply amass all the people who are
native speakers of a particular language; being a native English-speaker in the United States is not
the same as being a native English-speaker in England. Hence we cannot define our linguistic
community as containing all native English speakers, since this is simply too broad a description to
capture any useful notion of linguistic community.
One way of refining our notion of a linguistic community would be to complicate the description by
including a geographical location, but this almost certainly will also be insufficient; different groups
of English speakers may have different dialects or use different slangs than another. The primary
feature of their linguistic community is not that the members’ native language is English, but more
that they are members of a particular group and those members agree on the ways in which they use
language. This characterization is not a straightforward description that the members satisfy; it
speaks to the relation that holds among the members of a group, or between a person and the other
speakers whom she emulates. 10
Even if we ignore the difficulty inherent in formulating descriptions for particular communities, a
second issue remains. There is a kind of arbitrariness to community membership on the descriptive
concept which makes the community seem unsubstantial: if communities are formed simply by
collecting sets of individuals satisfying particular conditions, then almost any group could qualify as
a community. This includes groups such as the set of people with blue eyes who are over six feet
tall and live in Chicago. While we can certainly describe this collection, do we really want to claim
that it delineates a community? In general we seem to want communities to have more coherence
than we are likely to receive by random (or semi-random) generation. We place more weight on
communities than on other collections of people. As mentioned above, when we talk about
communities we stress the importance of common bonds or communication or fellow feelings –
these are not things that are likely to occur by simply gathering up all of the people who fit a
particular arbitrary description. Thus while community members may satisfy many of the same
7

Cheryl I. Harris discusses the desire to classify people who might be passing as white in “Whiteness as Property.”
One place you see this in common use is sexual orientation; it is not unusual to encounter discussions of what a
person’s sexuality “really” is, even if the person is taken to be in denial of it.
9
I will discuss these ideas in more detail below.
10
I suspect that we are actually members of nested linguistic communities, wherein our particular dialect is a
subcommunity of our particular language. Since we have not yet succeeded in formulating a purely descriptive notion
of a linguistic community, however, it seems overly optimistic to consider linguistic subcommunities as well. Suffice to
say that the account of what linguistic communities we belong to will almost certainly be complicated.
8
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descriptions, there is another aspect of community membership that should be considered as well;
this is how the relational concept of community arises.
III.

The Relational Concept of Community

Given the problems faced by the descriptive concept of community, one might wonder why anyone
would entertain it, even momentarily, as an adequate understanding of community. The answer is
that most communities involve a descriptive component, and it is easy to slide from using the
description as shorthand to taking the description to be a full definition of the community. When
we consider the situation more rigorously, however, the insufficiency is revealed. For example we
mentioned that a linguistic community at first glance might seem simply to consist of everyone
satisfying the trait of speaking a specific language. Once we begin refining the idea, however, we
see the inadequacies of this definition 11. Even leaving aside the issues of regional linguistic
variation mentioned above, we face fundamental questions such as how well one must speak a
language to count as a member of the community. This is not something that we can create an
arbitrary rule for (“You must know 3000 words of language X to count as an X-speaker”); it
involves being recognized by other members of the community as a speaker. This moves beyond a
description (“Everyone who speaks X”) to considering how a member (or potential member)
interacts with others in the group.
Indeed, the traits which philosophers have associated with vibrant and healthy communities almost
all rely not simply on members satisfying a particular description, but rather on some kind of
relation being present among members. For instance, communication is often stressed as
foundational to having a community. 12 This requires having some kind of recognition of the other
members of your community – unless you realize that someone else also belongs to your
community, you are unlikely to feel a strong obligation to communicate with them. 13 Similarly,
sometimes community is taken to require a uniting bond and some kind of mutual concern. 14 The
uniting bond may be a shared interest or belief, which could certainly be captured descriptively.
However, a requirement of mutual concern is a specific relation defined among the members of that
community; it is more complex than a property possessed by a single member.
This leads to the relational concept of community. This concept incorporates some of the features
of the descriptive concept, since often the members of a particular community will satisfy a
common description. However, it is not the description which is the focus of this concept of
community; instead, the focus is on the relations among members of the community, as well as
between individual members and the community as a whole. A community is thus no longer simply
a set of people – it incorporates a particular kind of relation defined on it as well.
11

The following is only one of many inadequacies in the definition; I certainly do not intend to suggest that this is all
we need to clarify in order to have a perfect conception of a linguistic community.
12
John E. Smith’s discussion in “The Value of Community: Dewey and Royce” of the role community plays in the
work of those two philosophers contains a nice discussion of a community’s need for communication.
13
Clearly you may end up communicating with nonmembers for various pragmatic reasons, such as needing to buy
groceries in a foreign country, but you will not feel that there is any obligation to communicate with them for any more
fundamental reason.
14
A number of people stress uniting bonds and the necessity of mutual concern. See Andrew Mason’s requirement of
mutual concern in “Liberalism and the Value of Community” and Nancy Sherman’s notion of transcendence in “The
Virtues of Common Pursuit.”
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For instance, one very small (but fairly ubiquitous) kind of community that people commonly
encounter is the clique. One does not become a member of a clique simply by satisfying a
description that applies to the other members. It may certainly help you join the athletic clique if
you are athletic or the popular girls’ clique if you are a popular girl. However, to become a true
member of that clique, you also have to be acknowledged by the other members as such. There is
thus a relation of recognition between the new (or potential) member and other members of the
clique. 15 Hence a full understanding of the community would likely involve realizing that to be a
member you must both satisfy whatever general description suits most of the members of the clique
and also be recognized as a member by a sufficient number of the members of that group. Note that
this view of community does not eliminate the descriptive element. In most communities, there will
still be something that binds the members – some trait that they have in common. However,
satisfying that description alone is not sufficient for membership; members must also satisfy a
requirement of recognition.
There are also communities where the relation in question is one of self-recognition (or perhaps
more familiarly, self-identification); one becomes a member of that group by taking oneself to be a
member. One place that this is often demonstrated is with respect to cultural identities. Cultural
identities are not solely a product of one’s national heritage or the racial category one falls into.
There are people who may not culturally identify as Irish, say, because they or their families have
lived elsewhere for a long time; the cultural traditions of Ireland are no longer particularly important
to them. On the other hand, people may identify with the group even if they are not from Ireland.
For instance, if a person marries a member of a cultural group, the spouse may start to absorb the
traditions of the community; eventually they may self-identify as a member of that culture. Hence
the relation in this case is between the member and the group as a whole rather than a relation
between members of the group. 16
The contrast between the descriptive and relational notions of community is illustrated by two
common but distinct notions of geographical communities. A geographical community seems
fairly easy to define on the descriptive notion; it is simply all people living within specified
geographic boundaries. However, it is not clear that merely living on the same chunk of land is
sufficient to be a member of a community. It is entirely possible to live somewhere and never know
any of your neighbors and even, perhaps, to lack any shared fundamental goals or common beliefs.
Hence one could certainly argue that this set of people does not form a community. 17
This does not necessarily mean that geographical communities fail to exist, however. We can form
something more recognizable as a community by adding some additional criteria. For instance,
suppose we limit the group to members who are recognized by their neighbors either as belonging
to the same group or as sharing the same concerns; perhaps everyone in the neighborhood is united
15

It is not clear whether all members must recognize you as a member for you to be one. This will likely vary
depending on the size of the community you are trying to join and the type of community. If it is a very tightly-knit
community, probably a larger percentage of members will have to recognize you as a member in order for you to
qualify. If it is less concerned with the relations among members than with other factors – such as common interests –
probably a smaller percentage of members will have to recognize you.
16
We will discuss in a moment whether self-identification is sufficient for group membership; it is likely that the
member must also satisfy a particular description.
17
See, for instance, Darrin Barney, “The Vanishing Table, Or Community in a World That is no World,” p. 37.
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by their desire to keep a shopping center from being built on the corner of a nearby street.
Alternatively, it could be a case of self-identification where one is a member if one feels one
belongs. These are both more robust notions of community; the relationship among the members
transforms our set from a collection of people who only have one trait in common into a group of
people who have common interests or beliefs. 18
Indeed, this kind of distinction between mere geographic collection and claiming that those people
share common goals or beliefs underlies the argument about whether national communities exist.
Some people take nations to be merely collections of people within particular sets of geographic
boundaries. They point to the undoubted variation in beliefs and practices across a nation and claim
that there is no reason to think such a large, diverse group of people form a community. Others take
it that there are fundamental traits that underlie a nation – either people have national pride and selfidentify as a member of that nation, or they share common beliefs (such as in a right to freedoms of
various kinds.) 19 The argument therefore comes down to a claim that a descriptive notion of
nationhood is not a community, but this leaves open the question of whether there is a relational
notion of national community.
This relational notion of community is less tidy than the descriptive notion, largely because the
relation itself is quite fluid. It is not clear that each member needs to stand in relation to every other
member. Particularly in a larger group, it is impractical to suggest that all members must recognize
all other members as belonging to the community – many of the members may never come into
contact. It may be instead that you simply need to be recognized by some member (who is in turn
recognized by other members) in order to belong; this community would resemble a web or network
of members, where there were chains of membership recognition, but not everyone would be
recognized by everyone else. 20
It is also not clear that self-identification is sufficient to be a member of a community. If I selfidentify as Christian, say, but do not acknowledge any of the teachings of Jesus Christ, it is unclear
whether I would actually belong to the Christian community; most of the other members of the
Christian community would not recognize me as a member. There are two possibilities for
explaining this. First, it could be that their recognition (or lack of recognition) overshadows my
self-identification. Thus the fact that I self-identify as Christian is outweighed by the fact that most
of them refuse to recognize me as such. However, it is questionable whether we wish to be
committed to this stance. This puts a great deal of power in the hands of the majority, even with
regard to fairly personal communities; do we want to claim that a person is misidentifying their
sexual identity, say, simply because other members of the community do not take them to be gay or
18

Exactly what kind of relation is defined on this community could vary. For instance, it could be a relationship
wherein one member is recognized by another as belonging to the community. Or it could be a relation between the
member and the community as a whole, such as where a person feels a part of the neighborhood/nation/etc. and thus
self-identifies as a member of the community. We will discuss problems raised by self-identification further in a
moment.
19
David Miller has a detailed discussion what traits underlie the notion of national identity in his paper “In Defense of
Nationality;” while geographic location is one of the traits, it is neither the only one nor the most important one.
20
It is entirely possible that such a community is weaker than one in which everyone recognizes everyone else as a
member. This sort of claim is made particularly about online communities. (For instance, see Hubert L. Dreyfus, On
the Internet or Thomas C. Anderson “The body and communities in cyberspace: A Marcellian analysis.”) However, a
discussion of the strength of such relationships is beyond the scope of this paper.
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lesbian? It is not clear why the opinion of others – even the opinion of a majority of others –
overrules one’s own assessment.
The second possibility is that the relational concept of community either always or usually includes
a descriptive component. Therefore, the problem is not that I self-identify as Christian; the problem
is that I do not satisfy even the most basic descriptive requirement. Granted, the description of
Christianity must have some flexibility in it; there is disagreement within the religious community,
as in most communities. However, some pieces of those descriptions have more importance than
others, and a failure to recognize the teachings of Christ (or to recognize the existence of God, for
that matter) would serve to disqualify one from the community. Under this conception of
community, neither satisfying the description nor satisfying the relation is sufficient; it is necessary
to satisfy both in order to be a member of the community.
IV.

Further Questions

The questions raised by self-identification point to a number of directions for further work; I will
provide thoughts on a few of them here. I have proposed a notion of communities which involve
both a descriptive and a relational component; one issue worth pursuing is whether those halves are
both necessary. Could there be a community defined purely by a relation or a community defined
purely by a description? I am not certain. We discussed problems with purely descriptive
communities in Section II; although the argument did not render descriptive communities
impossible, it raised sufficient challenges to render their existence unlikely. As for the other
extreme, I am wary of saying that communities can be defined solely by a relation. The Christianity
example demonstrated certain problems with using self-identification as the only standard for
community membership. Recognition by other members, however, also encounters a problem when
there is no underlying description. Such a community would consist of people recognized as having
membership in a group with no other criteria besides being acknowledged as members. Yet, if this
were the case, on what basis would I recognize your membership? There appears to be no
cohesiveness to such a group, no basis for affirming or rejecting someone as a member. Thus such
a group lacks a coherent identity and does not seem to be something we would want to call a
community.
If a community exists which is purely relational, then it seems that it will have to involve a more
complex relation than one solely concerning membership; neither self-identification nor recognition
by others suffices to generate a community. An open question, then, is whether we can devise a
community which is defined without description, but rather in terms of our membership relation and
some other more complex relation. One possibility for this additional relation would be the
requirement of mutual concern mentioned above; perhaps it would be possible to define a
community of those who recognized each others as members and exhibited said mutual concern.
However, it is again not clear to me whether this provides sufficient basis to form a community;
why should I have concern for another member of the group if there is no underlying shared trait?
Further work is needed to reach a conclusion on this topic.
The recognition relation itself is open to further investigation, particularly as regards to whether I
must be aware that I am recognized as a member of a community. We mentioned previously that it
seemed odd that one could belong to a community, on the descriptive notion, without being aware
7

of that membership; this problem recurs for the relational notion if self-identification is unnecessary
for community membership. Consider the following illustration taken from the debate over the
moral standing of animals. In general, we believe that animals are unaware of their membership in
the moral community and, as such, will not be able to fulfill the obligations we usually associate
with members. 21 For instance, we do not find tigers unethical for mauling humans, despite the fact
that we would often find humans unethical for assaulting people in similar situations. In part this
stems from the fact that we believe humans to be aware of how it is permissible to treat other
members of the moral community; tigers are not aware of this and perhaps are not capable of
becoming aware of it. If we generalize the recognition requirement to permit the recognition of
unaware people as members, then we may encounter similar problems with imposing obligations on
them as a result of that membership; like the tiger, there seems something potentially unfair about
this. 22 There is thus a question about whether self-identification is necessary for community
membership or whether one can (under at least some circumstances) be a community member
without knowing it.
One interesting place that this issue arises is in looking at past or future community membership.
The relation, as I have currently defined it, takes place in the present – it has to do with either being
recognized (now) as a member or self-identifying (now) with a group. Yet, of course, most
communities exist beyond the present set of members; they have pasts and, hopefully, futures as
well. Furthermore, frequently there is a sense of identification with the past members and hopes for
future members; there is some kind of relationship between these people and current members.
This relation needs to be explored in more detail, particularly in regard to the self-identification
question raised above; neither past nor future members are in a position to self-identify as members
at the present, which may further complicate our understanding of the relation needed for
membership.
Other structural questions arise concerning the recognition relation. We discussed earlier attempts
to form communities of race from a descriptive standpoint and the problems generated thereby.
However, a relational community of African-Americans certainly exists; it would be worth
considering other examples of communities that started off with a description (even a wildly
incorrect description) and resulted in a true relational community. Furthermore, there could be
commonalities among disparate communities in terms of the recognition structures. It would be
worth investigating whether communities with weaker bonds of recognition (such as virtual
communities) have fewer of the positive features we associate with communities.
V.

Conclusion

Arguments about communities are complicated by the temptation to take a shorthand description as
a complete characterization of what a community is. While it is possible that one might devise a
community which is defined purely descriptively, it is clear that in general that concept of
community will not suffice; simply picking out sets of people who share a trait is not a promising
way to understand communities. To do justice to the nature of communities, we require the added
21

See, e.g., Roger Scruton’s Animal Rights and Wrongs on this subject.
I say “potentially” because it may be that in some circumstances you ought to be able to deduce that you have been so
recognized; in this case, you could be informed if you chose to figure it out. It is not clear that the obligations are unfair
in such a case. (Hence a person could not escape community obligations simply by trying to ignore her membership.)
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complexity of the relational notion. This is not to say that description is irrelevant to understanding
communities; indeed, it is likely that there will be a descriptive component to most, if not all,
communities. Community membership will thus be a matter of satisfying a particular description
and also either self-identifying or being recognized by others as a member of that community.
Further work remains to be done to clarify the relational concept of community. It remains an open
question, at present, as to whether a community can exist which lacks either the descriptive or the
relational component. Similarly, the exact nature of the relation deserves further study, particularly
with regard whether I must self-identify as a member of a community or whether it is possible to be
a member without knowing it. There are interesting questions of generalization related to how the
relation functions when looking at community membership across time and also related to whether
we can find structural similarities across different kinds of communities. With the current
controversy over whether virtual communities are true communities, very interesting possibilities
arise when considering whether the strength of the recognition relation might affect the positive or
negative features of that community. The relational concept of community thus provides a better
understanding of community than the descriptive concept, while leaving open a number of
philosophically promising areas for further study.
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